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I. INTRODUCTION
Although difficult to measure precisely, the U.S. market for
pharmaceuticals is approaching $300 billion, including more than $100
billion paid for by the federal government.' Outlays, including federal
obligations, are expected to increase dramatically as the population ages.
2
The new administration faces a daunting task in terms of managing the
system; it must find ways to stimulate innovation, control costs, and ensure
that people have access to new products at affordable prices.
Changes are needed in the way that drug developers are rewarded, in
order to address many of the best-known flaws of the current system.
These flaws expose the need to control costs, promote useful innovation
and expand access. Four options are discussed, each building upon the
others, and departing further from the status quo.
. James Love, M.P.A., is Director of Knowledge Ecology International (KEI). This paper
was presented in a keynote address at Loyola University Chicago School of Law's Second
Annual Beazley Symposium on Access to Health Care, "Perspectives on Patents and
Patients: Can They Co-Exist?" in November 2008.
Tim Hubbard, Ph.D., is Head of Informatics at The Wellcome Trust Sanger Institute,
Cambridge, UK, and Joint Head of the Ensembl genome annotation project.
The authors are indebted to the advice and commentary from many persons, including the
participants of a January 28-29, 2008, KEI & UNU-MERIT Workshop on Medical
Innovation Prizes in Maastricht, the Netherlands, a February 8, 2008 KEI & George
Washington University Law School Workshop on Medical Innovation Inducement Prizes, in
Washington, D.C., an April 11, 2008 MSF expert meeting on R&D for tuberculosis in
Geneva, Switzerland, and a January 16-17, 2009 KEI, Health Action International, MSF,
Oxfam, UAEM & lQsensato Roundtable on prizes for Type II & III diseases in Geneva,
Switzerland. KEI is grateful for support for work on medical innovation inducement prizes
from the Open Society Institute, the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation, the
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1. Pharm Exec Staff, Pharm Exec 50: The Winners' Circle, PHARMACEUTICAL
EXECUTIVE, May 1, 2008, at 74, 82.
2. PHARMACEUTICAL RESEARCH & MFRS. OF AM., PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY PROFILE
2008, 19-26 (2008).
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1. The first option is to retain almost everything about the current
system, but to replace the exclusive rights to make or sell a product,
following approval by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA), with
mega cash prizes that are linked to the impact of the product on health
care outcomes.
3
2. The second option builds on the first, but allocates a portion of the
prize money to non-affiliated and non-remunerated parties whose open
and freely-licensed research, data, materials, know-how or technologies
were instrumental in the success of the final product.
3. The third option builds on option two by setting aside some of the
money for investments and prizes that would be made in the translational
or early phases of development, to be managed by competitive
intermediaries, who will be resourced on the basis of their measurable
and objective contributions to products that actually succeed.
4. The fourth option would eliminate patent thickets by removing the
exclusive right to use inventions in upstream research in favor of a
system that gives the freedom to use inventions so long as the patent
owners receive remuneration.
3. For different views on the use of prizes to stimulate medical R&D, see generally 151
CONG. REC. E149 (extensions of remarks Feb. 2, 2005) (statement of Rep. Bernard Sanders);
Bruce G. Charlton, Mega-Prizes in Medicine: Big Cash Awards May Stimulate Useful and
Rapid Therapeutic Innovation, 68 MED. HYPOTHESES 1, 2 (2007); J. A. DiMasi & H. G.
Grabowski, Should the Patent System for New Medicines Be Abolished?, 82 CLINICAL
PHARMACOLOGY & THERAPEUTICS 488, 488-90 (2007); Thomas C. Erren, Prizes to Solve
Problems in and Beyond Medicine, Big and Small: It Can Work, 68 MED. HYPOTHESES 732,
733 (2007); D.F. Horrobin, Glittering Prizes for Research Support, 324 NATURE 221 (1986);
Tim Hubbard & James Love, A New Trade Framework for Global Healthcare R&D, 2 PLoS
BIOLOGY 147, 150 (2004) [hereinafter Hubbard & Love, A New Trade Framework]; James
Love & Tim Hubbard, The Big Idea: Prizes to Stimulate R&Dfor New Medicines, 82 CHI.-
KENT L. REv. 1519, 1528-34 (2007) [hereinafter Love & Hubbard, The Big Idea]; Ron
Marchant, Managing Prize Systems: Some Thoughts on the Options, 2 KNOWLEDGE
ECOLOGY STUD. (2008); Joseph E. Stiglitz, Scrooge and Intellectual Property Rights: A
Medical Prize Fund Could Improve the Financing of Drug Innovations, 333 BRIT. MED. J.
1279, 1279-80 (2006); Marlynn Wei, Should Prizes Replace Patents? A Critique of the
Medical Innovation Prize Act of 2005, B.U. J. ScI. & TECH. L. 25, 44-45 (2007); Amy
Dockser Marcus, Finding a Cure: Will Sharing Ideas Advance Cancer Research? Hedge-
Fund Managers Offer $1 Million Prize to Combat Scientists' Culture of Secrecy, WALL ST.
J., Sept. 18, 2007, at D1; Burton A. Weisbrod, Solving the Drug Dilemma, WASH. POST,
Aug. 22, 2003, at A2 1; Aidan Hollis, Incentive Mechanisms for Innovation (Institute for
Advanced Policy Research, Technical Paper TP-07005 (2007); JAMES LOVE, THE ROLE OF
PRIZES IN STIMULATING R&D (2007), available at http://www.who.int/phi/public-hearings/
second/contributionssection2/Section2_JamesLove-KEI_prizes.pdf; JAMES LOVE,
CONSUMER PROJECT ON TECH., SUBMISSION OF CPTECH TO IGWG FIRST PUBLIC HEARING
(2006), http://www.who.int/phi/publichearings/first/en/ (last visited Feb. 16, 2009).
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These proposals are not a substitute for the important and significant role
of governments and donors in funding of research through grants, which are
necessary to promote and sustain research programs, and which will
continue to play an important role in the development of new products. The
use of prizes is intended as an alternative to the "pull" incentives now
implemented as legal monopolies to make, use or sell products.4
II. THE RATIONALE
To many consumers and policy experts, high prices for medicines are the
most visible flaw in the current system.5 This is most dramatically true for
products that treat severe illnesses. In addition to causing hardships related
to affordability, including millions of uninsured and under-insured persons,
consumers and third party payers avoid the use of high priced medicines,
leading to less access and worse health outcomes.6 Employers who bear the
costs of medicines through health benefits find ways to avoid hiring or
retaining workers who need expensive medications. Further, the relatively
high prices for medicines in the United States puts U.S. employers at a
competitive disadvantage.
7
Despite sharp increases in prices and high rates of growth in sales
revenue, the current system suffers from low productivity. The rate of
introduction of new chemical entities is relatively stagnant, particularly as it
relates to products that offer significant therapeutic improvements over
existing treatments. 8
There are a plethora of explanations for the productivity slowdown;
including an increasingly complex patent landscape that blocks innovation,
poor incentives to share research and provide access to knowledge, and few
capital market incentives to invest in translational products that have low
commercial prospects, but which may yield useful scientific information for
follow-up research efforts.9
Investment in research and development (R&D) for new medicines is
driven both by the U.S. domestic and foreign markets.1 ° According to
4. Love & Hubbard, The Big Idea, supra note 3, at 1528.
5. Id. at 1520.
6. Id. at 1525-26.
7. Id.
8. Id. at 1528. The FDA Center for Drug Evaluation and Research found that of the
1,284 new drug approvals from 1990 to 2004, only 289 (22.5%) were for "priority" reviews,
defined as a product that presents a "significant improvement compared to marketed
products in the treatment, diagnosis, or prevention of a disease." Id. Of the priority
products, only 183, or 14.3% of the total new drug approvals, were classified by the FDA as
new molecular entities. Id.
9. PHARMACEUTICAL RESEARCH & MFRS. OF AM., supra note 2, at 3-8.
10. Love & Hubbard, The Big Idea, supra note 3, at 1522-23.
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recent figures from IMS Health, a health care information and consulting
firm, in 2007, the United States represented approximately 40% of the
global market for pharmaceutical drugs," considerably higher than the U.S.
share of the global Gross Domestic Product (GDP) (27% in 2006),12 or
population (4.6% in 2006).' 3
Globally, for every dollar spent on drug purchases, less than nine cents
are reinvested in R&D. 14 Most private sector R&D outlays are directed at
products that offer few benefits over existing medicines. A significant
share of R&D outlays on clinical trials offer little or no scientific value, and
are rather used to generate data to advance marketing claims in areas where
similar products engage in non-price marketing claims competition
involving highly dubious trial design and reporting.15
This lack of R&D has other effects. There is a dearth of R&D for new
antibiotics, and perverse incentives for patent owners to over promote them
before patents expire, despite overuse leading to increased drug resistance. 16
Likewise, there is inadequate investment in vaccines.'
7
The international dimension of drug development is enormous, and often
troubling. Through its trade policy, the United States exerts pressure on
countries to adopt strict intellectual property rules and practices to weaken
11. IMS Health, Inc., IMS Health Reports Annual Global Generics Prescription Sales
Growth of 3.6 Percent, to $78 Billion, MED. NEWS TODAY, Dec. 11, 2008,
http://www.medicalnewstoday.com/articles/l32702.php [hereinafter IMS Health Reports].
12. Daniel Workman, Richest GDP Countries 2006: Nations with World's Wealthiest &
Fastest-Growing GDPs, SUITE 101, July 3, 2007, http://intemational-trade-
leaders.suitel 01 .com/article.cfn/richest gdpcountries_2006 (the U.S. share of high-income
countries GDP was about 28% in 2006).
13. Hoover Institution, Facts on Policy: U.S. Population Milestones (2006),
http://www.hoover.org/research/factsonpolicy/facts/4444946.html (last visited Apr. 16,
2009).
14. Love & Hubbard, The Big Idea, supra note 3, at 1523. In 2007, the share of global
sales invested in R&D was 8.2%. Global pharmaceutical sales were estimated at $712
billion for 2007. Pharm Exec Staff, supra note 1, at 84. Total private industry outlays on
pharmaceutical R&D were estimated at $58.8 billion for 2007. See PHARMACEUTICAL
RESEARCH & MFRS. OF AM., supra note 2, at 2.
15. JAMES LOVE, EVIDENCE REGARDING RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT INVESTMENTS IN
INNOVATIVE AND NON-INNOVATIVE MEDICINES, CONSUMER PROJECT ON TECHNOLOGY
(2003); Robert Langreth, Drug Marketing Drives Many Clinical Trials, WALL ST. J., Nov.
16, 1998, at A 10; Richard Smith, Medical Journals and Pharmaceutical Companies: Uneasy
Bedfellows, 326 BRIT. MED. J. 1202, 1202-05 (2003).
16. N. Kent Peters et al., The Research Agenda of the National Institute of Allergy and
Infectious Diseases in Antimicrobial Resistance, J. INFECTIOUS DISEASES 1087, 1087-93
(2008); James Love, Prizes, Not Prices, to Stimulate Antibiotic R&D, ScI. & DEV. NETWORK,
Mar. 26, 2008, http://www.scidev.net/en/opinions/prizes-not-prices-to-stimulate-antibiotic-r-
d-.html [hereinafter, Love, Prizes, Not Prices].
17. INST. OF MED., CALLING THE SHOTS: IMMUNIZATION FINANCE POLICIES AND
PRACTICES 1 (2000).
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or abandon price control mechanisms. 18 These pressures are most effective
in influencing developing countries, particularly those which rely upon
exports to the U.S. market. At the same time, the U.S. government is a
leading funder of global health care for acquired immunodeficiency
syndrome (AIDS), tuberculosis, and malaria, with growing demands that
the United States fund treatment in other areas. These programs are largely
unsustainable and limited in reach without access to competitively priced
generic products. As the primary incentive for private new drug
development is a prospective marketing monopoly, there is little private
sector investment in diseases that primarily affect low income persons
living in developing countries,' 9 or in emerging public health threats, such
as Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome or avian flu.
The costs of the current system are related to poorly designed incentives
for product development, a deeply flawed and highly manipulated
marketing effort, and weak efforts to regulate prices. The economic and
political power exercised by a handful of companies with a comparative
advantage in marketing products make the situation even more difficult to
manage.
Many proposals for health care reform call for difficult trade-offs. To
control insurance costs, access to treatment and care is rationed. In the area
of new medicines and vaccines, policy makers and consumers are
conditioned to think of innovation and access as mutually exclusive
objectives in conflict with each other. High prices and poor access to new
products are accepted as necessary to induce investment in the next
generation of products. We argue that the reforms proposed here can break
this mold, offering greater innovation and greater access, at a lower cost.
The core idea is to separate the market for innovation from the market
for innovative products. Generic competition would be allowed for all
products as soon as they enter the market, driving prices down. The
developers of new medicines and vaccines would be rewarded directly by
prizes. The prizes would be linked to the impact of innovations on health
18. See, e.g., OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, 2008 SPECIAL REPORT (2008)
(with respect to the entirely legal and transparent use of compulsory licenses to expand
access to medicines for AIDS, heart disease, and cancer, the U.S. Trade Representative
(USTR) wrote "[w]hile the United States recognizes the importance of Thailand's public
health challenges, Thailand's recent policies and actions regarding the compulsory licensing
of patented medicines have contributed to continuing concerns regarding the adequate and
effective protection of IPR [intellectual property rights] in Thailand. The United States is
awaiting further information on the new Thai government's approach in this area and hopes
to work constructively on this and other IPR issues in order to strengthen Thailand's IPR
regime.").
19. COMM'N ON INTELLECTUAL PROP. RIGHTS, INNOVATION & PUB. HEALTH, WORLD
HEALTH ORGANIZATION, PUBLIC HEALTH INNOVATION AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS
(2006), available at http://www.who.int/intellectualproperty/documents/thereport/ENPublic
HealthReport.pdf.
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care outcomes, regardless of who actually delivered the product to patients.
The elimination of all legal barriers to the competitive supply of the
products would be linked to the Food and Drug Administration (FDA)
approval process. Patents would be used, not as monopolies for market
products, but as mechanisms to stake claims on the prize money. Prizes
would also reward unpatented innovations and investments.
For the new approach to work in the U.S. market, the rewards for product
development will have to be very large, involving billions of dollars.
However, the expense of the prizes would be far less than the amount that is
now spent to support the current regime of temporary legal monopolies for
new medicines.
The use of cash prizes to eliminate legal monopolies for products
provides a powerful opportunity to address several flaws that plague the
current system. In particular, policy makers would have far more freedom
to design incentives efficiently. For example, rewards can be directly
linked to the improvements in health outcomes, when benchmarked against
existing treatments, rather than rewarding the replication of benefits already
available from existing products. This has the benefit of driving investment
toward treatments that address unmet needs. The elimination of the product
monopolies and the enabling of generic competition will also lower prices,
reducing treatment costs and personal hardships, while expanding access.
It is also possible to design prizes to reward and encourage collaboration
and the sharing of knowledge, materials and technologies. Prizes can
encourage investments in translational research with low prospects for
commercial success, but which is of significant value in terms of advancing
scientific knowledge.
Like other mechanisms for financing R&D, such as grants, or the
management of incentives that rely upon exclusive marketing rights, the
implementation of prize systems is fraught with challenges. However,
these challenges are manageable. But before considering prizes further, it is
useful to discuss the challenges of managing the current system, using price
controls.
III. THE LIMITS OF PRICE NEGOTIATION/ REGULATION STRATEGIES
The use of prizes to replace monopolies is a radical change in the
business model for pharmaceutical innovation. A less disruptive approach
is to continue to reward drug development with product monopolies, while
reforming the way in which the U.S. government negotiates or regulates
prices. As the largest market in the world, the United States has enormous
economic clout and could obtain far lower prices, if so inclined. One
approach to obtain competitive prices for products with plausible substitutes
within a therapeutic class is to use restricted formularies, rewarding the
[Vol. 18
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cheaper products with favorable reimbursement and co-payment policies.20
In the absence of collusion, such policies can drive down prices. An
alternative approach that even works when products do not face competition
within a therapeutic group is to simply insist on prices of a particular
amount and threaten the use of compulsory licenses and procurement of
medicines from generic suppliers if drug manufacturers refuse to sell at
those prices. 21 These or many combinations of similar approaches are
clearly feasible. Why are prizes a superior alternative?
For the U.S. government, the easy part is lowering prices; this is just a
matter of political will. More challenging is how to design a pricing policy
that provides the right incentives for innovation, is not wasteful, and does
not impose unnecessary barriers for access for new medicines. Any price
negotiation strategy that is based entirely upon voluntary actions will leave
intact monopoly power for medicines that do not have sufficient therapeutic
alternatives. As seen in medicines for cancer, AIDS, and other severe
illnesses, patent owners are quite willing to offer very aggressive prices that
break private and government budgets, and which lead to rationing.22 But
even if the government is capable of exercising great power in negotiations
or regulation, it will have difficulty setting incentives right, so long as the
incentives are linked to the price. For example, suppose a treatment for
heart disease works with efficacy measured by an index value of 100, and a
new drug comes on the market that has the same exact same efficacy of
100, or an efficacy of 101. With most price regulation policies, the new
products would have at least as high a price as the older product. But the
medical value of the follow-invention is not significant, it is only
replicating something that already exists. This is an important flaw in a
policy that links R&D incentives to prices. Incentives to copy existing
medicines are too high, and incentives to address treatment gaps are too
low. 23 Monopoly supply with price regulation also leaves intact powerful
and difficult to monitor incentives to invest in wasteful marketing activities.
Current efforts to create pricing strategies that overcome some of the
best-known flaws in the current system include performance pricing
contracts and linking prices closer to independent evidence of
20. Etienne E. Pracht & William J. Moore, Interest Groups and State Medicaid Drug
Programs, 28 J. HEALTH POL. POL'Y & L. 9, 25 (2003).
21. Brian T. Liberis, Compulsory Licensing and the TRIPS Agreement: A Solution to
High Drug Prices in the United States?, 28 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L. REV. 57, 65-66 (2005).
22. James Love, AstraZeneca Tells New Zealand Cancer Patients They Will Withdraw
Cancer Drug from the Market to Protest Government Pressures to Lower Prices,
HUFFINGTON POST, Dec. 18, 2005, http://huffingtonpost.cotrdjames-love/astrazeneca-tells-
news zea b_12475.html.
23. See Hubbard & Love, A New Trade Framework, supra note 3, at 148.
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effectiveness. 24 However, these efforts are second-best efforts to imitate the
pricing models that are proposed with prizes, operating in an environment
where legal monopolies have enormous resources to lobby for changes to
game the system.
Many of the more ingenious efforts to reform pricing policies involve
extensive price discrimination--different prices for different indications
and uses of medicine, and different prices for different patients, based upon
incomes, insurers or geographic regions. Unfortunately, tiered pricing and
other price discrimination efforts are difficult to administer and enforce, and
are often frustrated by off-label uses, diversion, parallel trade or third
party/foreign reference pricing schemes.26
With prizes rather than monopolies, where rewards would be tied to
actual health benefits, drug developers could not benefit from investments
in marketing activities that expand access to medicines of marginal benefits
at high prices. The de-linking of R&D incentives from prices provides
much more freedom to design incentives that reward the types of innovation
that improve health outcomes. This separation would stimulate an
environment where every patient can benefit from marginal cost pricing of
products, consumers and third party payers have no incentives to restrict
access to the newest medicines, and it is no longer necessary to introduce
trade distorting restrictions on the free movement of goods.
IV. IMPLEMENTING INNOVATION INDUCEMENT PRIZES IN THE U.S.
MARKET
A. Option 1: Replace the exclusive rights to make or sell a
product, following FDA approval, with large cash
prizes that are linked to the impact of the product on
health care outcomes.
The most important reform in the system of incentives for drug
development is to eliminate the set of exclusive rights that are now offered
to induce development of new drugs. These exclusive rights are associated
most importantly with patents on pharmaceutical inventions, but also
include a growing set of non-patent mechanisms to bar competition; for
example, market exclusivity associated with pediatric drug testing as a
24. JAMES LovE, THE ROLE OF PRIZES IN DEVELOPING Low-COST, POINT-OF-CARE RAPID
DIAGNOSTIC TESTS AND BETTER DRUGS FOR TUBERCULOSIS (2008), http://www.keionline.org/
misc-docs/Prizes/prize tb msf expert meeting.pdf [hereinafter LOVE, THE ROLE OF PRIZES];
Meredith B. Rosenthal et al., Pay for Performance in Commercial HMOs, 355 NEW ENG. J.
MED. 1895 (2006).
25. Love & Hubbard, The Big Idea, supra note 3, at 1548.
26. Id.
[Vol. 18
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reward for the development of "orphan" drugs and biologics, and to prevent
unauthorized competitors from relying upon clinical trial data to register
new products.27 Taken together, these measures are explicitly designed to
grant legal monopolies on new medicines, with the intention that the
monopoly profits will stimulate useful R&D. As discussed above, the
shortcomings of such a system are many; including, hardships associated
with high prices (a barrier to access and a burden for consumers, employers
and society at large), investments in the development of medically
unimportant products, as well as wasteful and often harmful marketing
activities.
This option of cash prizes, one of four increasingly ambitious reforms
discussed in this article, considers a key change in the business model for
rewarding developers of new medicines. Specifically, legislation similar to
S.2210,28 the Medical Innovation Prize Fund (MIPF), would eliminate
exclusive marketing rights for all prescription medicines.29 Additionally,
the incentives now associated with expected monopoly profits would be
replaced with large cash rewards for successful products.3 °  The
fundamental idea is to separate the market for products from the market for
innovation by removing the link between R&D incentives and product
prices. By allowing for competition and low generic prices for the products
themselves, utilization of newer products would no longer be discouraged
simply because of the high prices now associated with patented inventions.
1. Recent Interest in Medical Innovation Prizes
The use of prizes to reward innovation has long been of interest to
27. In the United States, the period of exclusivity for pharmaceutical drugs is five years
for new chemical entities. 21 U.S.C. § 355(c)(3)(E)(ii) (2006); 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(F)(ii)
(2006); 21 C.F.R. § 314.108(b)(2) (2008). The period of exclusivity is three years for a new
indication for a drug. 21 C.F.R. § 314.108(b)(4)(iv) (2008). In Europe, the period of
exclusivity for pharmaceutical test data can be extended to a maximum of eleven years. See
Council Directive 2004/27, art. 10, 2004 O.J. (L 136) 34, 40 (EC). Manufacturers of
biologic products are asking for twelve years of exclusivity in the U.S. market as a condition
to the introduction of a system of bio-similars to promote entry by generic products. See
Pathways for Biosimilars Act, H.R. 1548, 11 th Congress (2009). By requiring generic
suppliers to replicate experiments on humans, these intellectual property regimes routinely
violate the Declaration of Helsinki on Ethical Principles for Medical Research Involving
Human Subjects. For example, paragraph 17 of the Declaration, states "[p]hysicians should
abstain from engaging in research projects involving human subjects unless they are
confident that the risks involved have been adequately assessed and can be satisfactorily
managed. Physicians should cease any investigation if the risks are found to outweigh the
potential benefits or if there is conclusive proof of positive and beneficial results." WORLD
MED. ASS'N, DECLARATION OF HELSINKI (2008).
28. Medical Innovation Prize Act of 2007, S. 2210, 110th Cong. (2007).
29. Id. § 5 (2007).
30. Id.
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economists and others, as evidenced by a plethora of recent proposals to use
prizes to stimulate research into areas as diverse as the environment,
energy, climate control, mining, space travel, software, and airport
security. 31 More recently, however, there has been a growing interest in
using prizes to simulate R&D in the areas of medicinal technologies.32
2. 1999 to 2004
The early roots of this interest include a number of different proposals
and initiatives. In 1999, Michael Kremer and others proposed creating
large rewards for investments in vaccines for malaria and certain tropical
diseases.33 In 2001, the pharmaceutical company Eli Lilly created the firm
InnoCentive to administer a series of commercially-sponsored prizes to
solve specific problems in the area of life sciences.34 Later, a number of
philanthropic organizations sponsored medical innovation prizes, including
but not limited to the X-Prize Foundation, the Prize4Life Foundation, and
the Gotham Prize.35
In 2002, the pharmaceutical company Aventis held discussions on
possible future pharmaceutical scenarios, including one proposed by Tim
Hubbard and James Love that featured prizes and the elimination of
36
monopolies on all new medicines. This scenario was presented at a
number of academic and policy workshops in 2003 and 2004. Separately,
in August 2003, the economist Burton Weisbrod published an editorial in
the Washington Post, which called for "[t]wo prices--one for the R&D,
another for the resulting pills. ' 37  Weisbrod noted, "this solution is not
painless, but neither is the course that public policy is now on., 38
31. James Love, Would Cash Prizes Promote Cheap Drugs?, NEW SCIENTIST, Nov. 12,
2007, at 24; Jim Tharpe, $500,000 Prize for Quick Lines at Airport, ATLANTA J. CONST., Jan.
8, 2008, at Al.
32. Matt Richtel, Silicon Valley Meets 'American Idol' with Prizes to Inspire Inventors,
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 16, 2007, at C8.
33. Unlike the approach recommended here, Kremer and colleagues focused on
subsidies to the prices paid by consumers, rather than prize rewards operating independent of
prices. Rachel Glennerster & Michael Kremer, A Better Way to Spur Medical Research and
Development, 23 REG. 34, 36 (2000).
34. Cornelia Dean, If you Have a Problem, Ask Everyone, N.Y. TIMES, July 22, 2008, at
Fl; Innocentive.com, About Us, http://www.innocentive .com/about-us-open-innovation.php
(last visited Jan. 29, 2009).
35. See Elizabeth Bernstein, Gotham Prize Honors New Cancer Research, WALL ST. J.,
Apr. 1, 2008, at D3; Steve LeVine, The X Factor: Can Big Money Contests Save
Innovation?, Bus. WK., Dec. 1, 2008, at 54; Prize4life.org, Our Story,
http://www.prize4life.org/page/about/our-story (last visited Feb. 8, 2009).
36. Love& Hubbard, The Big Idea, supra note 3, at 1521-22.
37. Burton A. Weisbrod, Editorial, Solving the Drug Dilemma, WASH. POST, Aug. 22,
2003, at A21.
38. Id.
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3. 2005 to 2006
In 2005, Representative Bernard Sanders introduced the first MIPF
proposal,39 setting out a particular implementation of the new approach and
stimulating additional interest among academics. In 2006, Joseph Stiglitz
began publishing a number of widely read articles calling for the use of
prizes to reward drug development.40 In May of 2006, the World Health
Assembly passed resolution WHA60.30. In the context of the addressing
the unmet health needs of developing countries, the resolution called upon
the Director General of the World Health Organization (WHO) to
"encourage the development of ... incentive mechanisms ... addressing
the linkage of the cost of research and development and the price of
medicines, vaccines, diagnostic kits and other health-care products. 'A
4. 2007 to 2008
In 2007, Senator Sanders re-introduced the MIPF as S.2210. 42 Also in
2007, John Edwards called for prizes rather than monopolies to stimulate
drug development.43 In 2008, Stan Finkelstein and Peter Temin from the
Massachusetts Institute of Technology published Reasonable Rx: Solving
the Drug Price Crisis, a book calling for the separation of the R&D
incentive from the price of the drug.44 In April 2008, in a WHO negotiation
over new approaches to stimulating medical R&D, the governments of
Barbados and Bolivia made five separate proposals to use prizes for
medical innovation.45 In May of 2008, the World Health Assembly adopted
a Global Strategy and Plan of Action, which among other items, agreed to:
39. Medical Innovation Prize Act of 2005, H.R. 417, 109th Cong. (2005).
40. See, e.g., Joseph Stiglitz, supra note 3, at 1279-84; Joseph Stiglitz, Give Prizes Not
Patents, NEW SCIENTIST, Sept. 16, 2006, at 21.
41. W.H.A. Res. 60/30, § 3,14, U.N. DOC. A60/VR/I11 (May 23, 2007).
42. Medical Innovation Prize Act of 2007, S. 2210, 110th Cong. (2007).
43. Posting of Sarah Rubenstein to Health Blog, Edwards Pushes Prizes Over Patents
for Drugs, http://blogs.wsj.com/health/2007/1 1/14/Edwards-pushes-prizes-over-patents-for-
drugs/ (Nov. 14, 2007, 11:07 EST).
44. Stan Finkelstein & Peter Temin, Reasonable Rx: Solving the Drug Price Crisis
(2008). The book jacket included positive reviews from Kenneth Arrow, the Nobel Laureate
in Economics, Roger Williams, the Chief Executive Officer of the United States
Pharmacopeia, Representative Barney Frank, and Dr. Jirgen Drews, a retired President of
Roche Pharmaceutical Group Global Research. Id.
45. The proposals were: (1) Prize Fund for Development of a Low-Cost Rapid
Diagnostic Test for Tuberculosis, (2) Prize for the Development of New Treatments for
Chagas Disease, (3) Priority Medicines and Vaccines Prize Fund (PMV/pf), (4) Cancer
Medicines and Vaccines in Developing Countries, and (5) A Licensed Products Prize Fund
(LP/pf) for Donors. Working Document Proposed by Barbados and Bolivia,
http://www.keinonline.org/misc-docs/b_b-igwg/workingdocumentbarbados-bolivia.pdf
(Apr. 2008).
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[E]xplore and, where appropriate, promote a range of incentive schemes
for research and development including addressing, where appropriate,
the de-linkage of the costs of research and development and the price of
health products, for example through the award of prizes, with the
objective of addressing diseases which disproportionately affectS46
developing countries.
5. The Medical Innovation Prize Fund Approach
The two U.S. MIPF bills proposed by Congressman Sanders presented
the first fully specified possible implementation of prizes in the context of a
major market for medicines.47 The drafters of the MIPF sought to address
several important technical questions relating to the allocation of prizes.
48
The basic approach followed one of the scenarios outlined in the 2002
Aventis scenarios-planning exercise.49
a. The prize fund will receive an annual contribution based upon a
fraction of the GDP.
50
b. All of the annual funding is spent every year on qualifying products
and processes.
51
c. The prize fund of a fixed size is divided among qualifying products, in
a zero sum competition. The more given to one product, the less
available to competitors.
52
d. Every new product "wins" something, but products that have a greater
impact on health outcomes receive more.
46. W.H.A. Res. 61/21, § 36, 5.3(a), U.N. Doc. A61/Vr/8 (May 24, 2008)
47. Medical Innovation Prize Act of 2007, S. 2210, 110th Cong. (2007); Medical
Innovation Prize Act of 2005, H.R. 417, 109th Cong. (2005).
48. Medical Innovation Prize Act of 2007, S. 2210, 110th Cong. §§ 9, 11(c) (2007);
Medical Innovation prize Act of 2005, H.R. 417, 109th Cong. §§ 9, 1 l(c) (2005).
49. Love & Hubbard, The Big Idea, supra note 3, at 1522.
50. Medical Innovation Prize Act of 2007, S. 2210, 110th Cong. § 15(a)(2) (2007);
Medical Innovation Prize Act of 2005, H.R. 417, 109th Cong. § 16(a)(2) (2005) (allocating
50 basis points in the 2005 bill, and 60 basis points in the 2007 bill).
51. Medical Innovation Prize Act of 2007, S. 2210, 110th Cong. § 15(b) (2007); Medical
Innovation Prize Act of 2005, H.R. 417, 109th Cong. § 16(b) (2005).
52. Medical Innovation Prize Act of 2007, S. 2210, 110th Cong. § 11 (c) (2007); Medical
Innovation Prize Act of 2005, H.R. 417, 109th Cong. § 11 (c) (2005).
53. Medical Innovation Prize Act of 2007, S. 2210, 110th Cong. § 9 (2007); Medical
Innovation Prize Act of 2005, H.R. 417, 109th Cong. § 9 (2005).
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e. New products (and processes) participate in the fund for 10 years.54
The reward in any given year is independent of future rewards, and is
based upon the best available evidence (at that time) of the impact of the
product on health outcomes.
55
f. The impact on health outcomes is benchmarked against available
technologies, rather than placebos.
56
g. Products that are registered with the FDA at "roughly" the same time
are compared to products "that were not recently developed."
57
The distinction between individual "Prizes" and a "Prize Fund" is
important and worth emphasizing. When designing for a single outcome, it
is hard to choose the appropriate size of the "Prize." If the prize is too
small, the incentive is insufficient to stimulate R&D. If the prize is too
large, the mechanism is inefficient. A "Prize Fund" avoids this issue by
allowing different R&D innovations to compete against each other (item 3.
above). Over time the number of competitors and the scale of their
investments in R&D innovations will equilibrate to match the overall size
of the Prize Fund, ensuring efficient allocation.
Three other features deserve discussion. First, the MIPF provides that
the amount of the prize money that any one product can receive in a given
year is limited to 5% of the annual prize fund payments.58 Second, in cases
where there is a follow-on product, the MIPF would continue to make
payments to the original product, even when its market share falls to zero,
to "the degree that the new.. . product, or manufacturing process was based
on or benefited from the development of the existing... product, or
manufacturing process." 59 Third, the MIPF provides specific set-asides for
areas of public health priority; including (A) current and emerging global
infectious diseases; (B) severe illnesses with small client populations, and;
(C) neglected diseases that primarily afflict the poor in developing
54. Medical Innovation Prize Act of 2007, S. 2210, 110th Cong. § 9(d)(3) (2007);
Medical Innovation Prize Act of 2005, H.R. 417, 109th Cong. § 9(d)(3) (2005).
55. Medical Innovation Prize Act of 2007, S. 2210, 110th Cong. § 9(c) (2007); Medical
Innovation Prize Act of 2005, H.R. 417, 109th Cong. § 9(c) (2005).
56. Medical Innovation Prize Act of 2007, S. 2210, 110th Cong. § 9(c)(2) (2007);
Medical Innovation Prize Act of 2005, H.R. 417, 109th Cong. § 9(c)(2) (2005).
57. Medical Innovation Prize Act of 2007, S. 2210, 110th Cong. § 9(c)(2) (2007).
58. Medical Innovation Prize Act of 2007, S. 2210, 110th Cong. §§ 9(d)(4), 15(a)(2)
(2007); Medical Innovation Prize Act of 2005, H.R. 417, 109th Cong. §§ 9(d)(4), 16(a)(2)
(2005) (At present levels of proposed funding, this would be roughly $4 billion per year, or
$40 billion (plus the rate of growth in GDP) over a ten-year period.).
59. Medical Innovation Prize Act of 2007, S. 2210, 110th Cong. § 9(d)(1) (2007);
Medical Innovation Prize Act of 2005, H.R. 417, 109th Cong. § 9(d)(1) (2005).
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countries. 60 (See Document 1.)
Document 1: S.2210 Criteria for Prize Payments
SEC. 9. PRIZE PAYMENTS FOR MEDICAL INNOVATION.
(a) Award- For fiscal year 2008, and each subsequent fiscal year, the
Board shall award to persons described in subsection (b) prize
payments for medical innovation relating to a drug, a biological
product, or a new manufacturing process for a drug or biological
product.
(b) Eligibility- To be eligible to receive a prize payment under
subsection (a) for medical innovation relating to a drug, a biological
product, or a manufacturing process, a person shall be-
(1) in the case of a drug or biological product, the first person
to receive market clearance with respect to the drug or
biological product; or
(2) in the case of a manufacturing process, the holder of the
patent with respect to such process.
(c) Criteria- The Board shall, by regulation, establish criteria for the
selection of recipients, and for determining the amount, of prize
payments under this section. Such criteria shall include
consideration of the following:
(1) The number of patients who would benefit from the drug,
biological product, or manufacturing process involved,
including (in cases of global neglected diseases, global
infectious diseases, and other global public health priorities) the
number of non-United States patients.
(2) The incremental therapeutic benefit of the drug, biological
product, or manufacturing process involved as compared to
existing drugs, biological products, and manufacturing
processes available to treat the same disease or condition,
except that the Board shall provide for cases where drugs,
biological products, or manufacturing processes are developed
at roughly the same time, so that the comparison is to products
that were not recently developed.
(3) The degree to which the drug, biological product, or
60. Medical Innovation Prize Act of 2007, S. 2210, 110th Cong. § 9(c)(3) (2007);
Medical Innovation Prize Act of 2005, H.R. 417, 109th Cong. § 9(c)(3) (2005).
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manufacturing process involved addresses priority health care
needs, including-
(A) current and emerging global infectious diseases;
(B) severe illnesses with small client populations (such as
indications for which orphan designation has been granted
under section 526 of the Federal Food, Drug, and
Cosmetic Act (21 U.S.C. 360bb)); and
(C) neglected diseases that primarily afflict the poor in
developing countries.
(4) Improved efficiency of manufacturing processes for drugs
or biological processes.
(d) Requirements- In awarding prize payments under this section,
the Board shall comply with the following:
(1) In cases where a new drug, biological product, or
manufacturing process offers an improvement over an existing
drug, biological product, or manufacturing process and the new
drug, biological product, or manufacturing process competes
with or replaces the existing drug, biological product, or
manufacturing process, the Board shall continue to make prize
payments for the existing drug, biological product, or
manufacturing process to the degree that the new drug,
biological product, or manufacturing process was based on or
benefited from the development of the existing drug, biological
product, or manufacturing process.
(2) The Board may not make prize payments based on the
identity of the person who manufactures, distributes, sells, or
uses the drug, biological product, or manufacturing process
involved.
(3) The Board may award prize payments for a drug, a
biological product, or a manufacturing process for not more
than 10 fiscal years, regardless of the term of any related
patents.
(4) For any fiscal year, the Board may not award a prize
payment for any single drug, biological product, or
manufacturing process in an amount that exceeds 5 percent of
the total amount appropriated to the Fund for that year.
6. Relationship to Patents
While the MIPF eliminates market exclusivity for products, it does not
15
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eliminate patents.61 Patents will continue to be available for new medicines,
and are valuable assets, not as legal monopolies, but to make claims on the
prize fund money. Strictly speaking, the Sanders bills did not change the
system of exclusive rights for drug, biologic, or vaccine development until
after a product received FDA approval.62 Drug developers would have to
litigate or negotiate with patent owners to obtain the necessary rights to
register products, as they do today. In practice, however, the elimination of
the post-marketing approval exclusive rights would create a very new
dynamic for patent owners. The total reward for drug development would
be fixed by the size of the prize fund.63 A patent system that created too
many barriers to product development would be easier to reform, because
changes would not change the overall system of sustainable rewards.
7. The Size of the Prize Fund
The 2007 version of the prize fund used 60 basis points of U.S. GDP for
the level of funding. 64 This was approximately $80 billion in 2008.65 The
amount of the fund was the subject of considerable discussion and
analysis, 66 although the level of proposed funding is not easily explained by
any single number. Among the data examined were the total global outlays
on R&D, 67 industry-wide pharmaceutical profits from U.S. sales of
medicines, the market capitalization of the pharmaceutical industry, the size
of pharmaceutical royalties reported to income tax authorities, the estimated
risk adjusted costs of drug development, and other factors.
The amount of the prize fund in S.2210 is considerably larger than the
total global private sector R&D outlays on new medicines, as estimated by
the International Federation of Pharmaceutical Manufacturers, and
considerably larger than estimated profits from the U.S. market, which
includes profits from drug development, but also profits from
manufacturing, distribution and marketing of products.68
In terms of the magnitude of the S.2210 prize fund, it is important to
keep in mind that new medicines are used everywhere on the planet, and the
U.S. economy is only about one quarter of global GDP and roughly one-
61. Medical Innovation Prize Act of 2007, S. 2210, 110th Cong. § 2(11) (2007).
62. See id. § 3.
63. Id. § 9(d)(4).
64. Id. § 2(18).
65. Medical Innovation Prize Act of 2007, S. 2210, 110th Cong. § 2(18) (2007).
66. Wei, supra note 3, at 32.
67. Love & Hubbard, The Big Idea, supra note 3, at 1541. According to PhRMA, global
private sector R&D outlays for new medicines were $58.8 billion in 2007, $56.1 billion in
2006, and $51.8 billion in 2005. Id. at 1524.
68. Id. at 1523.
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third of high income GDP.69  If foreign consumers (governments,
employers, and individuals) collectively added rewards that only equaled
U.S. outlays, the relevant reward would be $160 billion.70 If foreign
consumers doubled U.S. contributions, global rewards would be $240
billion, more than a third of 2007 global pharmaceutical sales, and more
than four times the 2007 global private sector outlays on pharmaceutical
R&D. 71 Given the disproportionate size of the existing U.S. contribution to
global medical R&D costs, the implementation of a prize fund in the United
States would provide substantial benefits even if other countries did
nothing. However, it would be better for all if there were incentives for all
countries to support R&D costs equitably. Treaty structures to incentivise
this have been proposed 72, but are beyond the scope of this article.
8. Net Benefits of the Prize Fund Approach
a. Price Savings
The cost of the proposed MIPF in S.2210 is roughly $80 billion per year
at current levels of GDP.73 Eliminating monopolies on medicines will lead
to substantial savings in prescription drug outlays, although the total
amount of the savings is hard to determine. In recent years, the Generic
Pharmaceutical Association has estimated that the average price of a
generic drug prescription is about 30% of the price for a brand name drug.
74
IMS reports that generic prescriptions compose 65% of the market by
volume and 20.5% by revenue, suggesting that the brand name products are
7.2 times more expensive than generics. 75 Even this may understate the
potential savings from eliminating drug monopolies. The long period of the
monopoly, including the ability to build up the trademark, creates price
contours that influence the pricing of generics. In contrast, where markets
are competitive and distribution systems are efficient, competition can
radically change prices. For example, Plavix, a popular medicine for heart
disease, was priced at roughly $2 per pill in Thailand before it issued a
69. THE WORLD BANK, GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT 2007 1, 4 (2008),
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/DATASTATISTICS/Resources/GDP.pdf.
70. See Medical Innovation Prize Act of 2007, S. 2210, 110th Cong. § 2(18) (2007).
71. See id. (offering $80 billion as the U.S. outlay amount); see also Love & Hubbard,
The Big Idea, supra note 3, at 1522 (stating IMS estimates of global sales for pharmaceutical
products).
72. Hubbard & Love, A New Trade Framework, supra note 3, at 150.
73. Medical Innovation Prize Act of 2007, S. 2210, 110th Cong. § 2(18) (2007).
74. GENERIC PHARMACEUTICAL Ass'N, FACTS AT A GLANCE (2009), http://
www.gphaonline.org/about-gpha/about-generics/facts.
75. IMS Health Reports, supra note 11; see also Medical Innovation Prize Act of 2007,
S. 2210, 11 0th Cong. § 2(12) (2007).
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compulsory license and imported generic versions.7 6 The generic versions
were priced at less than 3 cents per pill. 77 Another example is the AIDS
drug nevirapine, which costs $13.50 in the U.S. for a daily dose of two 200-
milligram tablets.78 In countries where competition is allowed, two generic
tablets are available for 13 cents, a price decrease of 99%.79 For many
products, including those for severe illnesses, savings of 95% to 99% are
feasible, once competition is allowed.
Even with large price savings, it does not appear that the $80 billion cost
of the MIPF will be offset by federal outlays on pharmaceutical in the near
term. In 2007, the combined federal outlays on prescription drugs has been
estimated at approximately $100 billion.80 It would take a projected price
decrease of 80% across the board to break even.81 The Congressional
Budget Office is unlikely to make such a prediction. The bill, however,
will create enormous savings for state and local governments and private
sector employers and individual consumers. The findings of S.2210
suggest national saving in excess of $200 billion per year,82 and this is
certainly realistic.
If S.2210 is reintroduced it may be appropriate to consider sharing the
cost of the prize fund with other beneficiaries of the bill, including in
particular states and employers, and or private health insurance companies.
b. Better Targeting of R&D
To some prize fund proponents, the most important benefit is the
improved targeting of R&D incentives. Today, most R&D spending is
wasted on products that offer almost no realistic chance of offering
significant health benefits over existing products.8 3 The prize fund would
dramatically reduce incentives for investments in medically unimportant
products, while making it highly profitable to invest in products that truly
improve health care outcomes.
76. Third World Network Info Service on Intellectual Property Issues, Thailand to
Import Plavix Generics from India, Third Word Network, Aug. 29, 2007,
http://www.twnside.org.sg/title2/intellectual_property/info.service/twn.ipr.info.080701 .htm.
77. Id.
78. Kaisemetwork.org, Boehringer to Reduce Price of Antiretroviral Nevapine in Low-,
Middle-Income Countries, Official Says, May 16, 2007, http://www.kaisemetwork.org/
Dailyreports/repindex.c fm?DRID=44932.
79. Id.
80. Medical Innovation Prize Act of 2007, S. 2210, 110th Cong. § 2(13) (2007).
81. Id. § 2(14).
82. Id. § 2(15).
83. Love & Hubbard, The Big Idea, supra note 3, at 155 1.
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c. Incentives for Rational Marketing Practices
Marketing practices today are rational responses to our system of R&D
incentives. With a legal monopoly to sell and product, and returns based
upon the number of units sold at monopoly prices, companies have
enormous incentives to invest in marketing of products to doctors and
consumers, even for uses where the drug is of marginal use or even
dangerous. 84 If prizes are implemented as rewards for improvements in
health outcomes, irrational uses of medicines become a negative rather than
a positive.
d. Reactions to S.2210
The 2005 and 2007 versions of the MIPF have been debated in a number
of workshops, meetings, and consultations, where the proposal has received
high marks from many pharmaceutical experts, 85 but also some skepticism
and criticism. Much of the criticism concerns the anticipated political
difficulties associated with major and potentially disruptive changes for a
86large and politically powerful sector of the economy. Even many of these
critics have suggested that the proposal has merit, but should be
implemented on a smaller scale, either for special health problems like
neglected diseases that predominately concern low income persons living
developing countries, or for products such as antibiotics where current
87market incentives are particularly perverse.
There are also debates over technical details of the valuation methods,
the size of the fund, the allocation of funding among beneficiaries, the
global trade framework for R&D, and certain legal issues.
88
In addition to the concerns that the MIPF approach is too ambitious, are
those that say it is not ambitious enough.89 In particular, some would prefer
a system that relies entirely upon open source research, or one that includes
deeper reforms in the patent system.90 Modifications to the basic prize fund
84. An example of this is the extensive marketing of Vioxx to patients who could have
used equally effective and safer medicines. See e.g., id at 1534; Alex Berenson, Studies
Find Higher Risk with Vioxx, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 13, 2006, at A18; Stephanie Saul, Media:
Drug Makers to Police Consumer Campaigns, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 3, 2005, at C7.
85. See generally, KNOWLEDGE ECOLOGY INT'L, EXPERTS COMMENT ON S.2210, THE
MEDICAL INNOVATION PRIZE FuND (2007), www.keionline.org/misc-docs/Prizes/
experts on s2210.pdf.
86. Wei, supra note 3, at 44.
87. Love & Hubbard, The Big Idea, supra note 3, at 1531.
88. Id. at 1535-46. Including particularly those relating to the transition from the current
system and the degree to which the prize fund is consistent with the WTO TRIPS
Agreement. Id. at 1543-44.
89. Id. at 1521-22.
90. Id.
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proposal are considered next.
B. Option 2: Open Source Dividends to Reward the Sharing of
Knowledge, Data and Technology
One explanation of the low productivity in drug development is that
scientists and firms involved in medical R&D are not sufficiently open in
terms of access to knowledge, and that restrictive licensing practices
discourage research in areas where patents exist. New development models
in the field of software and innovative information services have enhanced
interest in approaches that promote more access to knowledge, and greater
sharing and freedom to use and improve upon innovations pioneered by
others.91
If prizes are used to reward innovations, it is possible to expand access
and redesign R&D incentives to more efficiently stimulate investments that
improve health outcomes.92
One criticism of prizes as an incentive is a concern that the prospect of a
prize does not encourage sufficient openness or sharing of knowledge,
materials, and technology. 93 Some have argued that a prize program that
rewards unpatented inventions, as does S.2210, may result in less openness,
because of reduced incentives to disclose inventions.94 Even if the prize
fund approach is neutral in terms of incentives to be open or share
knowledge, it is important to encourage and expand more openness.
Fortunately, prizes can also be designed to reward more access to
knowledge, materials and technology.
Historically, there are many innovation inducement prizes that mainly or
partly were designed to reward openness and technology sharing. Recent
examples include the Gotham prize for cancer research, the National
Academies prize for the development of economical filtration devices for
the removal of arsenic from well water in developing countries, or
numerous software prizes, such as Sun Microsystem's Open Source
Community Innovation Awards Program.95 One can also look to earlier
prizes to stimulate access to knowledge, such as the system of prizes
91. Tim O'Reilly, What is Web 2.0: Design Patterns and Business Models for the Next
Generation of Software, 65 COMMUNICATIONS & STRATEGIES, 17, 17 (2007).
92. Love & Hubbard, The Big Idea, supra note 3 at 1553.
93. Julien Penin, Patents Versus Ex Post Rewards: A New Look, 34 REs. POL'Y 641, 651
(2005).
94. Id. at 652.
95. See generally, Ushma S. Neill, The Gotham Prize: A Beacon for Cancer
Researchers, 117 J. CLINICAL INVESTIGATION 2016, 2016 (2007); BENJAMIN KROHMAL,
KNOWLEDGE ECOLOGY INT'L, PROMINENT INNOVATION PRIZES AND REWARD PROGRAMS
(2007); Press Release, Open Source, Open Source Communities Announce Participation
Details for Sun Sponsored $1 Million Innovation Awards Program, http://www.thesun.com/
aboutsun/pr/2008-0 I /sunflash.20080129.2.xml.
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administered by the city of Lyon France in the eighteenth century to
promote sharing of innovations in the silk manufacturing industry,96 the
British Elkington reward for disclosing an important technology to drain
farmland, prizes to encourage the disclosure and sharing of effective
irrigation practices in Italy and France or the French prize for "the best
manual, or practical and elementary instructions upon the art of piercing or
boring Artesian wells. 97
The issue of secrecy, openness and prizes was discussed at length in a
2008 workshop on medical innovation prizes at the United Nations
University at Maastricht, the Netherlands, and in an MSF workshop
examining the possible use of prizes to stimulate the development in a rapid
low-cost point of delivery test for tuberculosis.98 In the spring of 2008, the
governments of Barbados and Bolivia submitted five proposals to use prizes
to stimilate medical R&D to the WHO.99 Several of these prizes formally
introduced the notion of "open source" dividends to encourage greater
openness.1l° Among the specific proposals was the notion of sharing the
final product prizes with individuals, firms, and communities that share
knowledge, materials and technologies in a non-discriminatory and royalty
free manner. 10 1 There was also a proposal to share of the open source
dividends with journals that published research in full text without
subscription fees, creating a new incentive for journals to more openly share
research findings.10 2  The prize proposals submitted by Barbados and
Bolivia contained systems for rewards of interim research results that were
only available to entities that offered royalty free open licenses inventions,
96. Dominique Foray & Liliane Hilaire Perez, The Economics of Open Technology:
Collective Organization and Individual Claims in the 'Fabrique Lyonnaise' During the Old
Regime, in NEW FRONTIERS IN THE ECONOMICS OF INNOVATION AND NEW TECHNOLOGY:
ESSAYS IN HoNOuR OF PAUL A. DAVID 239, 243 (Cristiano Antonelli et al. eds., 2006).
97. See Selected Innovation Prizes and Reward Programs, KEI Research Note 2008:1,
7-9 (2008) (providing details of reward systems), http://www.keionline.org/misc-
docs/researchnotes/kei rn2008_1.pdf.
98. LOVE, THE ROLE OF PRIZES, supra note 24.
99. Proposed by Barbados and Bolivia (Apr. 2008), http://www.keionline.org/misc-docs/
b-b igwg/working document-barbados bolivia.pdf.
100. Proposal 1: Prize Fund for Development of Low-Cost Rapid Diagnostic Test for
Tuberculosis (Apr. 2008), http://keionline.org/misc-docs/b_b_igwg/propl-tbprize.pdf
[hereinafter Proposal 1]; Proposal 2: Prize for the Development of New Treatments for
Chagas Disease (Apr. 2008), http://keionline.org/misc-docs/b b igwg/prop2 cahagas-
prize.pdf [hereinafter Proposal 2]; Proposal 3: Priority Medicines and Vaccines Prize Fund
(PMV/pf) (Apr. 2008), http://keionline.org/misc-docs/b_b-igwg/prop3_pmv_pf.pdf
[hereinafter Proposal 3].
101. Proposal 1, supra note 100, at 2-3; Proposal 2, supra note 100, at 3; Proposal 3,
supra note 100, at 2.
102. Proposal 1, supra note 100, at 3; Proposal 2, supra note 100, at 3; Proposal 3, supra
note 100, at 2-3.
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data, materials, and know-how. 103 (See Document 2 and Document 3.)
Document 2: Working Document- Barbados and
Bolivia, Proposal 1
Prize Fund for Development of Low-Cost Rapid Diagnostic Test for
Tuberculosis
Incentives for Collaboration and Access to Knowledge
In order to ensure there are incentives for openness and sharing
among researchers, the Grand Prix prize money would be divided as
follows: The winning entrant would get 90 percent of the prize
money; the remaining 10 percent of the prize money would be given
to unaffiliated and uncompensated (by the winning entrant)
scientists and engineers that openly published and shared research,
data materials and technology, on the basis of who provided the
most useful external contributions to achieving the end result. This
would include research, data, materials and technology that were
either placed in the public domain, or subject to open, non-
remunerated licenses.
The biannual "best contributions" prizes would only be available to
technologies that were placed in the public domain, or licensed to
the TBLA.
To qualify for the "best contributions" prize, published research
findings would have to be freely available on the Internet in full text.
As an incentive to journals to make articles available to the public
for free, 10 percent of the "best contributions" prize given for a
published article would be available to a peer reviewed journal that
published the article, on the condition that the journal made the
article available for free immediately upon publication.
Document 3: Working Document - Barbados and
Bolivia, Proposal 3.
Priority Medicines and Vaccines Prize Fund (PM V/pJ)
Incentives for Collaboration and Access to Knowledge
103. Proposal 1, supra note 100, at 2-3; Proposal 2, supra note 100, at 3; Proposal 3,
supra note 100, at 2.
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In order to ensure there are incentives for openness and sharing
among researchers, the Final Product Prize money would be divided
as follows. The winning entrant would get 90 percent of the prize
money. The remaining 10 percent of the prize money would be
given to unaffiliated and uncompensated (by the winning entrant)
scientists and engineers that openly published and shared research,
data materials and technology, in the basis of who provided the most
useful external contributions to achieving the end result. This would
include research, data, materials and technology that were either
placed in the public domain, or subject to open, non-remunerated
licenses.
It is anticipated that the next version of the MIPF will include the notion
of open source dividends. 10 4 Every 1% of the U.S. MIPF is worth $800
million annually, so even a small percentage sharing of prize money could
dramatically enhance incentives to operate open libraries and databases and
publish in open journals.'0 5
C. Option 3: Adding prizes for interim benchmarks and discrete
technical problems, and translational research through
competitive intermediaries.
Some firms have suggested that a system of rewards for the development
of successful products should be modified, so that a system of prizes would
reward earlier steps in the development process. 10 6 Such firms, typically
small pharmaceutical and biotechnology firms, often rely upon financing
that focuses on the achievement of interim benchmarks, such as the
completion of Phase I or II clinical trials.10 7 These trials are expensive and,
more often than not, do not result in successful commercial products;
however, even these unsuccessful efforts yield useful information. In an
efficient capital market, investors would finance a portfolio of projects;
however, capital markets are not efficient for a variety of reasons. 0 8 The
asymmetric distribution of information between companies and investors
makes it difficult for investors to accurately evaluate proposed investments.
This leads to under-investment in projects that, while having a low
probability of resulting in a marketable final product, contribute to better
understanding of scientific and engineering challenges and opportunities.'0 9
It is, of course, possible to fund such projects through grants and other
up-front subsidies that are not tied to performance, and to some extent,
104. LovE, THE ROLE OF PRIZES, supra note 24, at 7.
105. Id.
106. Love, Prizes Not Prices, supra note 16.
107. See id.
108. Id.
109. See id.
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these subsidies exist." 0 For example, the U.S. Orphan Drug Act indirectly
subsidizes 50% of the costs of human use clinical trials, 1 ' and the U.S.
National Institutes of Health directly finances thousands of clinical trials for
a wide range of diseases." 2 However, approaches that rely entirely on up-
front subsidies have well-known shortcomings. Decisions about which
projects to fund through grants can suffer from uncritical evaluations of the
probability of success.' 13 Also, most current efforts to subsidize clinical
trials fail to address the relationship between the public subsidy and the
prices of products. 1
4
Prizes that reward successful outcomes can be implemented as an
alternative to a set of exclusive rights. Unfortunately, it is much more
difficult to evaluate the value of interim benchmarks than it is final products
that have concrete and observable utility in terms of influencing health
110. For discussions of the rationale for and the possibility of funding clinical trials as
public goods, see generally MARCIA ANGELL, THE TRUTH ABOUT THE DRUG COMPANIES:
How THEY DECEIVE Us AND WHAT To Do ABOUT IT, (Random House 2005); Dean Baker,
CENT. FOR ECON. AND POL'Y RESEARCH, THE BENEFITS AND SAVINGS FROM PUBLICLY-
FUNDED CLINICAL TRIALS OF PRESCRIPTION DRUGS (2008); I. Chalmers, Underreporting
Research is Scientific Misconduct, 263 J. AM. MED. ASS'N 1405 (1990); T. Bodenheimer,
Uneasy Alliance: Clinical Investigators and the Pharmaceutical Industry, 342 NEw ENG. J.
MED. 1539 (2000); Rich McManus, Abolitionist Angell Calls for Clinical Trial Reform, 53
NIH RECORD No. 15 (2001); John Yaphe et al., The Association Between Funding by
Commercial Interests and Study Outcome in Randomized Controlled Drug Trials, 18 FAM.
PRAc. 565 (2001); Sameer S. Chopra, Industry Funding of Clinical Trials: Benefit or Bias?,
290 J. AM. MED. ASS'N 113 (2003); Joel Lexchin et al., Pharmaceutical Industry
Sponsorship and Research Outcome and Quality: Systematic Review, 326 BMJ 1167 (2003);
Samuel 0. Thier, et al., Financial Anatomy of Biomedical Research, 294 J. AM. MED. ASS'N
1333 (2005); Benjamin Djulbegovic et al., Treatment Success in Cancer: New Cancer
Treatment Successes Identified in Phase 3 Randomized Controlled Trials Conducted by the
National Cancer Institute-Sponsored Cooperative Oncology Groups, 1955 to 2006, 168
ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 632 (2008); Tracy R. Lewis et al., The Case for Public Funding
and Public Oversight of Clinical Trials, THE ECONOMISTS' VOICE (2007); Crystal Phend,
NCI-Sponsored Cancer Trials Offer Decent Clinical Return on Investment, MEDPAGE
TODAY, Mar. 24, 2008; Thomas Alured Faunce, Senior Lecturer, Intellectual Monopoly
Privileges, Cost-Effectiveness Evaluation and the Knowledge Commons New Political
Paradigms for Wisdom in the Age of Corporate Globalisation, Presentation at TACD
meeting on the politics and ideology of intellectual property rights (Mar. 2006); Thomas
Alured Faunce, Toward a Multilateral Treaty on Safety and Cost-Effectiveness of Medicines
and Medical Devices, WHO Public Hearing on Public Health, Innovation and Intellectual
Property, (Nov. 14, 2006).
111. James Love & Michael Palmedo, Costs of Human Use Clinical Trials: Surprising
Evidence From the US Orphan Drug Act (2001), http://www.cptech.org/ip/health/orphan/
irsdata9798.html.
112. About ClinicalTrial.gov, http://clincaltrials.gov/ct2/info/about (last visited Mar. 18,
2009).
113. See James Love, Dir. Of the Taxpayer Assets Project, Ctr. For the Study of
Responsive Law, Comments Presented to the Second National Institute of Health CRADA
Forum (Sept. 8, 1994), http://www.cptech.org/pharm/crada2.html.
114. See id.
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outcomes. 1 5 In any centrally managed prize program for medical research,
the criteria for rewarding interim outcomes will be controversial, and
difficult to evaluate, and will suffer from many of the limitations that now
exist with systems of grants."16
Rather than search for consensus on one or more ingenious systems for
valuing interim results, policy makers can create an environment where
decentralized institutions make such valuations.'" 7 In this approach, there is
no need to legitimatize the valuation criteria, but rather to legitimize the
actors that make such valuations. Multiple intermediaries would be
resourced to award prizes for interim results, using their own methods. The
legitimacy of the intermediaries would be based upon the competition to
obtain funds.
In a 2002 Aventis scenarios-planning exercise, one model for funding
such prizes was to require employers to contribute to such intermediaries,
with the freedom to choose intermediaries. 18 An intermediary that was
successful in attracting funding from employers would have legitimacy by
virtue of the election by the employer, in a competitive environment.
Governments would play roles in terms of ensuring transparency and
accountability." 19 The 2008 proposals submitted by Bolivia and Barbados
contained the notion of competitive intermediaries in connection with a
proposed prize fund for priority medicines and vaccines. 120 (See Document
4.) If the MIPF followed this approach, it would allocate $16 billion per
year in interim prizes, an amount roughly half the current NIH budget.
Document 4: Working Document - Barbados and
Bolivia, Proposal 3
Priority Medicines and Vaccines Prize Fund (PMV/p)
Upstream Prizes
Twenty percent of the Priority Medicines and Vaccines Prize Fund
(PMV/pf) money will be allocated to three or more institutions that
115. LOVE, THE ROLE OF PRIZES, supra note 24, at 6.
116. Id. at7.
117. Id.
118. Love & Hubbard, The Big Idea, supra note 3, at 1530.
119. See James Love & Tim Hubbard, Paying for Public Goods, in CODE:
COLLABORATIVE OWNERSHIP AND THE DIGITAL ECONOMY (Rishab Aiyer Rhosh ed., MIT
Press 2005).
120. Working Document Proposed by Barbados and Bolivia, http://www.keinonline.org/
misc-docs/b_b igwg/workingdocumentbarbados _bolivia.pdf (Apr. 2008).
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run prize competitions to reward earlier stages of product
development. These will include smaller technical challenges, and
also rewards for the successful development of early benchmarks in
drug development, such as the completion of phase I/I clinical
trials.
Innovation inducement prizes that focus on solving small technical
challenges are similar to the type of prize competitions now being
offered by the Lilly-launched start-up company, InnoCentive, or
non-profit organizations such as the X-Prize Foundation. These
prize competitions could be outsourced to firms or non-profit
organizations with expertise in managing such innovation prizes.
The early benchmark prizes are similar to those used by venture
capital funds or big pharma companies to reward success in
upstream product development.
The competing institutions that run the upstream prizes will be
evaluated periodically to determine how successful they were in
investing in products that were successful. The upstream prize
managers who invest in products that are successful and improve
outcomes will also be rewarded by earning "points" that will entitle
them to shares in the final product prizes. Upstream prize managers
that do poorly will face reduced allocations or termination.
D. Option 4: A system of compensatory liability to reduce the
problem ofpatent thickets in upstream research.
1. Liability rules rather than exclusive rights
Governments often implement patents rights' 21 as a set of exclusive
rights, subject to some limited permitted uses, and the understanding that
abuses of exclusive rights are sanctionable by governments or courts. But
patents can also be implemented so that everyone has the freedom to use the
invention, subject only to an obligation to pay remuneration. 122
Compulsory licenses or a system of prizes such as the one envisioned by
S.2210 are types of liability rules. Through such rules, one may, in return
121. UNITED STATES PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, GENERAL INFORMATION
CONCERNING PATIENTS (2005), http://www.uspto.gov/go/pac/doc/general/. This also applies
to some degree with other intellectual property right regimes, including copyright, and
several sui generis regimes, including those involving drug registration data or plant breeder
rights. Id.
122. Jerome H. Reichman, Of Green Tulips and Legal Kudzu: Repackaging Rights in
Subpatentable Innovation, 53 VAND. L. REv. 1743, 1797-98 (2000); Mark A. Lemley,
Should A Licensing Market Require Licensing?, 70 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 185, 202
(2007).
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for payment of damages, use protected material without the consent of the
patent holder. 123 There are many possibilities for liability rules, including
instances where exclusive rights have some role, but where the threshold
for obtaining compulsory licenses is low, and one can realistically
anticipate obtaining non-voluntary authorizations in the event that voluntary
negotiations fail. The range of possibilities is large along a continuum that
begins with automatic rights to use inventions, and ends with no rights to
use inventions outside of voluntary authorizations from patent owners.
Among the examples of automatic rights are those in 28 U.S.C. 1498,
concerning "the use or manufacture of an invention ... by a contractor, a
subcontractor, or any person, firm, or corporation for the Government and
with the authorization or consent of the Government."' 124 Under this law,
persons authorized by the government have complete freedom to use any
patent, but the federal government accepts liability to compensate patent
owners for the use. 125  Disputes about the amount of compensation are
settled by the courts.126 Corporations providing goods and services to the
U.S. Department of Defense often use 28 U.S.C. § 1498, but the statute
extends to any use "for" the government, including, for example, the use of
the patented blackberry email service to federal employees, 27 the building
of bridges, or the acquisition of pharmaceutical drugs.
There are several examples of mandatory compulsory licenses that have
been implemented by governments. For instance, in 1980, when the United
Kingdom (UK) joined the European Union, it extended patent terms from
16 to 20 years. 128 To deal with the transition to the longer term, the UK
created a mandatory "license of right" for the extended term. 129 The United
States did the same thing when it implemented the WTO's Trade-Related
Aspects of Intellectual Property Law (TRIPS) Agreement, and switched
from a 17 to a 20 year patent term. 30 More recently, the European Union
has created a mandatory cross-licensing provision in the Directive on the
123. Ian Ayers & J.M. Balkin, Legal Entitlements as Auctions: Property Rules, Liability
Rules, and Beyond, 106 YALE L.J. 703, 704 (1996).
124. 28 U.S.C. § 1498 (2006).
125. Id. This provision also applies to copyrights and plant breeder rights. Id.
126. Id.
127. Paul M. Shoenhard, Who Took My IP? - Defending the Availability of Injunctive
Relieffor Patent Owners, 16 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 187, 233 (2008).
128. Yi Deng, The Effects of Patent Regime Changes: A Case Study of the European
Patent Office, 25 INT'L J. INDUS ORG. 121, 125 (2007).
129. James Love, Measures to Enhance Access to Medical Technologies, and New
Methods of Stimulating Medical R & D, 40 U.C. DAvIs L. REV. 679, 687 (2007).
130. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15,
1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex IC, Legal
Instruments - Results of the Uruguay Round, 33 I.L.M. 1197 (1994) (1994) [hereinafter
TRIPS Agreement].
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Legal Protection of Biotechnological Inventions, to ensure that European
plant breeders and inventors have the freedom to make improvements on
inventions.' 3' The European Union and India have both created mandatory
compulsory licensing regimes to respond to cases where medicines are
exported to a developing country under the new August 30, 2003 decision
of the WHO to implement Paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration on TRIPS
and Public Health. 1
32
Beginning in 2006, the United States has taken a step toward a system of
liability rules for patents. In a decision involving patent infringement by
the popular Internet auction service eBay, the U.S. Supreme Court held that
courts must consider the possibility of a forward looking remuneration as an
alternative to the enforcement of an injunction to protect the exclusive
rights of the patent owner. 133 Since the eBay decision, injunction cases
involving patent infringement have become a compulsory licensing
proceeding.134 Microsoft has obtained two compulsory licenses under the
new eBay doctrine. 135  Abbott Laboratories, Roche Pharmaceuticals,
Johnson and Johnson, Toyota, and many other well-known technology
firms have sought compulsory licenses, making the argument that the public
interest is best served by allowing infringements to continue, subject to
remuneration to patent owners. 1
36
The flexibility to implement liability rules within patent systems is
constrained somewhat, but not completely, by the WTO's TRIPS
Agreement. TRIPS is a complicated legal framework that includes seven
parts, including of particular relevance Part I, "General Provisions And
Basic Principles," Part 1I, "Standards Concerning The Availability, Scope
131. Council Directive on Legal Protection of Biotechnological Inventions 98/44, art.
52, 1998 O.J. (L 213) 17 (EC). "Whereas, in the field of exploitation of new plant
characteristics resulting from genetic engineering, guaranteed access must, on payment of a
fee, be granted in the form of a compulsory license where, in relation to the genus or species
concerned, the plant variety represents significant technical progress of considerable
economic interest compared to the invention claimed in the patent." Id.
132. Regulation 816/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council, 2006 O.J. (L
157) (EC); Janice M. Mueller, The Tiger Awakens: The Tumultuous Transformation of
India's Patent System and the Rise of Indian Pharmaceutical Innovation, 68 U. Prrr. L. REV.
491, 584-85 (2006).
133. eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 393-94 (2006).
134. Lawrence M. Sung, In the Wake of Reinvigorated U.S. Supreme Court Activity in
Patent Appeals, 4 J. Bus. & TECH. L. 97, 124 (2009).
135. James Love, Racist and Ignorant Reactions on Thailand Compulsory License, THE
HUFFINGTON POST, Jan. 25, 2007, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/james-love/racist-and-
ignorant-react_b 39618.html.
136. Id.; Marc Longpre, Federal Circuit Likely to Uphold Preliminary Injunction in
Amgen, Roche Case, FIN. TIMES (PHARMAWIRE), July 15, 2008, available at
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/2/d1013b44-5277-11dd-9ba7-000077b07658.html; James Love,
Abbott Recently Sought Compulsory License in US Patent Dispute, (2007),
http://www.keionline.org/content/view/43/.
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And Use Of Intellectual Property Rights," and Part III, "Enforcement Of
Intellectual Property Rights." '137
Most early discussions of non-voluntary authorizations to use patents
have focused on Parts I and II, and the provisions of Articles 30
(Exceptions to Rights Conferred) and 31 (Other Use Without Authorization
of the Right Holder), as well as the proposed 3 Ibis. 138 When attention is
focused on Article 31 of TRIPS, two provisions appear to present an
obstacle to the use of liability rules. The first provision is in Article 31 (b)
of TRIPS, and provides that non-voluntary authorizations to use patents
"may only be permitted if, prior to such use, the proposed user has made
efforts to obtain authorization from the right holder on reasonable
commercial terms and conditions and that such efforts have not been
successful within a reasonable period of time."' 39 This requirement, which
is waived in four important cases, 140 is not by itself an onerous burden for
some forms of liability rules. Prior voluntary negotiation is often useful to
reduce the burden on the state or the courts of evaluating reasonable terms
for non-voluntary authorizations. Potentially more problematic is the
provision in Article 31(f) of the TRIPS that limits non-voluntary
authorizations to uses "predominantly for the supply of the domestic
market." 141 Once considered a severe restriction on the use of compulsory
licenses, Article 31(f) is not absolute. 142 The restriction is waived entirely
within Article 31 when the authorization is a remedy to an anticompetitive
practice, something that is broadly defined under TRIPS Articles 8 and
40.'14 Article 31(f) also does not apply to imports or exports authorized
under Article 30, which is a different provision under which governments
can provide for non-voluntary uses of patents, including cases of importing
and exporting patented products to use in researching or testing for drug
registration requirements. 144  Some scholars argue that the exhaustion of
rights under Article 6 of TRIPS is another area where exports of patented
137. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 130.
138. Id. pt. 1, arts. 30, 31.
139. Id. art. 3 1(b).
140. Id. ("This requirement may be waived by a Member in the case of a national
emergency or other circumstances of extreme urgency or in cases of public non-commercial
use .... ); Id. art. 3 1(k) ("where such use is permitted to remedy a practice determined after
judicial or administrative process to be anti-competitive... "). There is no obligation for
prior negotiation for non-voluntary licenses issued under Article 3 Ibis of TRIPS.
141. ld. art. 31(f).
142. See Charlene A. Stern-Dombal, Tripping Over TRIPS: Is Compulsory Licensing
Under eBay at Odds with U.S. Statutory Requirements and TRIPS?, 41 SUFFOLK U. L. REV.
249, 265-66 (2007).
143. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 130, arts. 8, 40.
144. See Panel Report, Canada - Patent Protection of Pharmaceutical Products,
Complaint by the European Communities and Their Member States, WT/DS 1 14/R (Mar. 17,
2000).
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inventions may take place without the permission of patent owners. 145 In
Article 31bis, the WTO created a special and controversial exception to
Article 31(f) of TRIPS that only applies in practice for exports to
developing countries. 1
46
More recently, attention has been drawn to an entirely different
flexibility in TRIPS, not in Parts I or II but in the enforcement of rights
under Part III. 147 The recent court cases in the United States following the
eBay decision were about injunctions, 148 a topic addressed in Article 44 of
TRIPS. 149  According to this Article, WTO members need not grant
injunctions in cases where intellectual property owners receive
compensation. 150 There are indeed many cases where non-voluntary uses of
intellectual property rights are actually addressed in the context of remedies
to infringement, rather than through the creation of exceptions to those
rights. 151 For example, Canada and India, among other countries, do not
grant injunctions in cases involving infringements of architectural plans for
buildings that are partly or fully constructed, but rather requires
compensation to copyright owners, 52 a practice that is allowed under
TRIPS Article 44.2.153 The U.S. International Trade Commission explicitly
withholds injunctive relief for certain infringing patented goods into the
U.S. Market, when such imports enhance competition and consumer
welfare. 54 In U.S. patent infringement cases, injunctive relief is withheld
145. See, e.g., CARLOS CORREA, INTEGRATING PUBLIC HEALTH CONCERNS INTO PATIENT
LEGISLATION IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 71-72 (2000).
146. World Trade Organization, Amendment of the TRIPS Agreement, WT/L/641 (Dec.
8, 2005).
147. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 130, at part III.
148. See e.g., Sanofi-Synthelabo v. Apotex, Inc., 470 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2006); see
also Abbott Labs. v. Andrx Pharm., Inv., 452 F.3d 1331 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
149. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 130, art. 44.
150. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 130, art. 44.2.
151. See eBay, 547 U.S. at 394 (opening the door for district courts to deny injunctive
relief in favor of reasonable royalties); Brian J. Love, The Misuse of Reasonable Royalty
Damages as Patent Infringement Deterrent 4-7 (Mar. 11, 2009) (unpublished paper),
http://works.bepress.com/brianlove/2 (discussing reasonable royalty damages in patent
infringement cases).
152. Canadian Copyright Act, R.S.C. ch. C 42 § 40; The Copyright (Consolidation) Act,
1957, No. 14, Acts of Parliament, 1957, § 59.
153. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 130, art. 44.2.
154. Trade Agreement Act of 1979, 19 U.S.C. § 1337(d) (2006) ("Exclusion of articles
from Entry (1) If the Commission determines, as a result of an investigation under this
section, that there is a violation of this section, it shall direct that the articles concerned,
imported by any person violating the provision of this section, be excluded from entry in the
United States, unless, after considering the effect of such exclusion upon the public health
and welfare, competitive conditions in the United States economy, the production of like or
directly competitive articles in the United States, and United States consumers, it finds that
such articles should not be excluded from entry."); see also Posting of James Love, When
Customs Authorities May Allow Infringing Goods to be Imported into the United States,
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in a growing number of cases, including cases where the good is exported.
For example, in the Innogenetics v. Abbott Laboratories, royalties for a
"running royalty" were set in Euros. 155
The success or failure of a system of liability rules for patents will partly
depend upon the method of setting remuneration or compensation. The
durable appeal of exclusive rights regimes, despite the enormous costs they
impose in terms of high prices and blocked innovation, is that the valuation
of patents is determined by private parties, each protecting its own interests.
Interest groups, legislators, and courts are often skeptical that courts,
governments, or third parties can manage acceptable alternatives that
remove the ability to block usage, but still assign values to patents that are
both fair to users and adequately stimulate investment in research and
development.
Patent owners often express concern that compulsory licensing will lead
to a bias in favor of low rates of compensation and insufficient rewards for
innovation. 156  They also question the assumption that patents inhibit
innovation, since in a voluntary context, patent owners always have the
option of licensing rather than blocking welfare-enhancing innovations.
1 57
In practice, however, both patent owners and users have incomplete and
asymmetric information about the value of patents in a particular use, and
each have incentives to act strategically, factors that contribute in practice
to an underutilization of patented inventions.
The disputes about compulsory licensing or other types of liability rules
are particularly heated in the context of pharmaceutical inventions, which
are often very inexpensive to copy. 158 In a world where R&D incentives are
linked to drug prices, any relaxation of exclusive rights can lead to
competition that reduces monopoly rents and undermines incentives to
invest in R&D. 159 For this reason, patent offices and courts have often
allowed patent doctrines to stray far from their putative purpose of
Knowledge Ecology International Policy Blog, June 9, 2007, http://www.keionline.org/
component/option,comjd-wp/ltemid,39/p,32/.
155. Innogenetics, N.V. v. Abbot Labs., 512 F.3d 1363, 1380-81 (Fed. Cir. 2008)
("While the market entry fee was based upon the projection that Abbott could sell its product
through 2019, even Abbott acknowledges that such future sales would be subject to the
running royalty, a compulsory license. We remand to the district court to delineate the terms
of the compulsory license, such as conditioning the future sales of the infringing products on
payment of the running royalty, the 5-10 Euros per genotyping assay kit.").
156. See WILLIAM FISHER, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND INNOVATION: THEORETICAL,
EMPIRICAL, AND HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES 13 (2001), available at
http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/people/tfisher/Innovation.pdf; Colleen Chien, Cheap Drugs at
What Price to Innovation: Does the Compulsory Licensing of Pharmaceuticals Hurt
Innovation?, 18 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 853, 862 (2003).
157. See FISHER, supra note 156, at 7.
158. See FISHER, supra note 156, at 13; Chien, supra note 156, at 866, 872, 879.
159. See Chien, supra note 156, at 862, 872.
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rewarding invention. The expanding subject matter for patents and the low
standards for an inventive step can be thought of as indirect efforts to use
patents to protect investments.
The importance of patents in protecting investments is more important
for pharmaceutical inventions than it is for many other technology fields.
One observes very different perspectives on the patent system in other
industry sectors. For example, in the software, telecommunications, and
computing sector, a growing number of firms favor the abolishment or
weakening of software patents, and patent reform has been framed as a call
for higher standards of patentability, and a relaxation of exclusive rights in
favor of incremental steps toward liability rules.
160
By introducing a system of prizes to reward drug development, breaking
the link between R&D incentives and product prices, the pharmaceutical
industry's interest in patent reform would change dramatically. The
relevant factor in determining the overall R&D industry revenues is no
longer the potential revenues from drug sales, which is influenced in part by
the ability to exercise exclusive rights in products, but rather the size of the
prize fund. A patent system that requires costly litigation, creates long
bargaining delays, and blocks innovation can be seen as a negative, as will a
system that excessively rewards inventions at the expense of investments.
V. CONCLUSION
The current system for supporting innovation in the area of medical
technologies is costly, inefficient, and leads to underutilization of new
inventions, as well as unequal access. It is possible to do a better job of
managing the current system, but it is also possible to radically refashion
the approach, to provide for more innovation and more access, at a smaller
cost. Unlike other reforms in the health care sector that rely upon rationing
of access to control costs, the use of prizes to reward innovation would
expand access and increase investments in areas where innovation is most
important. It is not easy to change existing systems of innovation, but
neither is it easy not to change. It is difficult to imagine a more expensive
system of innovation that produces so little in terms of new medicines and
vaccines. A reform of the reward system for new medicines has enormous
potential to enhance innovation and access, not only in the United States,
but everywhere. Those who object to change should have the burden of
justifying the costly system of monopolies that we struggle with today.
160. See, e.g., Robert Hunt & James Bessen, The Software Patent Experiment, Q3 Bus.
REv. 22, 23, 30 (2004).
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